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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ANNA LEE ANDERSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 920228-CA

v.
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC.,
a foreign corporation,
RALPH PAHNKE and
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 25,

Priority No. 16

Defendants and Appellees,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Background Information
Norman Anderson created a trust in 1978, naming his
wife, Anna Lee, as beneficiary.
James, to serve as trustee.

He appointed his only child,

R.152.

Norman died in 1979, and

James Anderson assumed his duties as trustee of the Norman
Anderson Trust.

R.152.

The Trust assets consisted almost exclusively of shares
of stock held in a brokerage account in the Salt Lake City branch
office of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

R.147.

In May, 1980, the

stock was distributed from the Trust's account, some going into
James' personal account with Dean Witter and some going into his
mother's personal account there, too.

R.147, Exhibit A; 152-154.

Ralph Pahnke was the Dean Witter account executive for the
transaction.

R.147.

iv

Claims of the Parties
On December 6, 1990, Anna Lee Anderson filed an action
against Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke in the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah.
the action as beneficiary of the Trust.

R.la.

She brought

She contended the

distribution of the stock violated the allocation scheme set
forth in the Trust instrument.

She demanded money damages.

Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke filed a motion to dismiss
her complaint on April 15, 1991. R.40.

They claimed actions to

recover trust assets must be brought by the trustee, not by the
beneficiary.

Accordingly, Anna Lee lacked standing and the

trustee was an indispensable party.

On July 16, 19 91, the

district court granted the motion, dismissing Anna Lee's
complaint. R.91.
On July 22, 1991, before the district court had entered
the order of dismissal, an amended complaint was filed. R.92.
Anna Lee was replaced as the named-plaintiff by David M. Dudley,
successor trustee.

R.92, 154.

The district court signed an Order on September 16,
1991, dismissing Anna Lee's complaint.

R.214-216.

On October 9,

1991, Anna Lee filed a notice of appeal. R.224-225.

Mr. Dudley

did not appeal.
Disposition in the Court of Appeals
On November 13, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals issued
an opinion, reversing and remanding.
v

It held Anna Lee Anderson

had standing to bring this action, as beneficiary, to collect
trust assets and that she could pursue this appeal.

ARGUMENT
Introduction
Anna Lee Anderson brought this action, as beneficiary,
to recover assets owned by the Trust.

Dean Witter and Ralph

Pahnke contended Anna Lee could not bring the action absent
allegations the trustee had failed to bring it after demand or
that the trustee's self-interest put him in a position adverse to
hers.

Anna Lee failed to make these allegations and the district

court dismissed the action.
Immediately following dismissal Anna Lee voluntarily
withdrew as plaintiff in favor of the trustee.
appealed.

She then

Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke contended Anna Lee was no

longer a party and could not appeal.
The Court of Appeals determined both thai; Anna Lee
could bring her action and file this appeal.

Dean Witter and

Ralph Pahnke petition the Court to reconsider its opinion.

The

Court's holding ignores applicable legal authority and adopts
unworkable rules of law on issues of appellate jurisdiction and
the authority of a beneficiary to assert trust claims.
I.

ANNA LEE IS NO LONGER A PARTY TO THIS ACTION AND SHE CANNOT
APPEAL
Anna Lee Anderson filed this action and Later withdrew

as plaintiff.
plaintiff.

She allowed another to be substituted as named

Anna Lee was no longer a party to the action

following substitution, and lost all right to bring this appeal.
1

A.

Anna Lee Anderson Substituted David M. Dudley As The Sole
Plaintiff
Anna Lee Anderson was the plaintiff on the original

complaint.

Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke moved to dismiss her

complaint; their motion was granted.

Before the order of

dismissal was signed and entered, Anna Lee voluntarily withdrew
as a party to the action and allowed the trustee, David M.
Dudley, to be substituted as plaintiff.

Mr. Dudley filed and

served the First Amended Complaint, identical to the original
complaint but for references to himself as the new party
plaintiff.
The amended complaint was sufficient in and of itself
to substitute Mr. Dudley as plaintiff.1

Rule 15 of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure permits free amendment of a complaint if
done before a responsive pleading is filed.

The only pleading

filed by Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke was a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6).

It was not a responsive pleading.

Heritage

Bank & Trust v. Landon, 770 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
("A motion to dismiss . . . is not a responsive pleading which
would preclude an opponent from amending a complaint under Utah
R. Civ. P. 15(a) *once as a matter of course.'")
The amended complaint effectively changed plaintiffs.
Anna Lee was no longer a party; she had been replaced by Mr.
Dudley.

Roberts v. Husky Industries, Inc.. 71 F.R.D. 479 (E.D.

1

Anna Lee's motion to amend the complaint, filed six days
after the filing of the amended complaint, was superfluous.
2

Tenn. 1973) (facing a motion to dismiss, plaintiff amended the
complaint, before a responsive pleading was filed, to substitute
new plaintiffs); Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co. , 359 I'.2d 292, 296
(2d Cir. 1966) ("Rule 15(a) may be used to substitute new
plaintiffs."); Rosier v. Garron, Inc., 199 S.E.2d 50, 55 (W. Va.
1973) ("[T]he federal courts . . . have uniformly held that under
proper circumstances, a motion to substitute a party with
property capacity to sue is appropriate under Rule 15."); 6
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1474 at 549-52
(2d ed. 1990) ("[A] party may make a Rule 15(a) amendment to add,
substitute, or drop parties to the action." (footnotes omitted;
emphasis added.))
B.

The Trustee Did Not Appeal
David M. Dudley was the only plaintiff remaining after

substitution.

Mr. Dudley is not named in the notice of appeal,

however, and he is barred from pursuing this appeal.

Torres v.

Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988) ("The failure to name
a party in a notice of appeal is more than excusable
x

informality'; it constitutes a failure of that party to

appeal."); Magicsilk Corp. of New Jersey v. Vinson, 924 F.2d 123,
125 (7th Cir. 1991); Rule 3(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Practice ("The notice of appeal shall specify the party or
parties taking the appeal . . . . " ) .

3

C.

The Court of Appeals Incorrectly Concluded Anna Lee Anderson
Has Standing to Appeal
Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke advised the Court of the

jurisdictional problem posed by Mr. Dudley's substitution and
Anna Lee's notice of appeal.

See Brief of Respondents at 8-10.

It was the subject of considerable discussion during oral
argument.

Nevertheless, the issue was relegated to a footnote in

the opinion, and what analysis there is, ignores relevant facts
and applicable case authority.

The Court incorrectly disposed of

the issue.
The Court first mischaracterizes the effect of Anna
Lee's filing of the amended complaint by saying she "attempted to
file a document labeled Amended Complaint . . . ," and that
"...

it was in substance an attempt to substitute a party

plaintiff."

Opinion, fn. 1 at 2. (emphasis added).

an attempt.

The First Amended Complaint was filed with the

district court.

It was not

Substitution of parties was an accomplished

fact.
Anna Lee herself acknowledged substitution had been
achieved.

In a pleading filed with the district court she

admitted:
. . . Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint in this
matter. The Amended Complaint substitutes David M.
Dudley as Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust as the
Plaintiff therein.
R.178.

She repeated the admission in a subsequent pleading

before the district court.

R.205-206.
4

And, she admitted to this

Court in her opening appeal brief that she had "filed an Amended
Complaint naming David M. Dudley, Trustee of the Norman Anderson
Trust as plaintiff . . . ."

Brief of Appellant, J 4 at 12.

The First Amended Complaint was filed.
U.R.C.P.; Heritage Bank & Trust v. Landon, supra.
complaint substituted plaintiffs.

Rule 15(a),
The amended

Roberts v. Husky, supra;

Staggers v. Otto Gerdau. supra; Rosier v. Garron, Inc., supra;
Wright & Miller, supra.

Anna Lee ceased to be a party.

She lost

all right to appeal.
Second, the Court explained the resolution of the
jurisdictional issue depends on the amended complaint and,
because it was reversing the dismissal of the original complaint
and remanding, the Court would not reach any assignment of error
based on the amended complaint.

That the Court cannot do.

The

Court has the power and the duty to address every jurisdictional
issue.

It has recognized that "[t]he fundamental and initial

inquiry of a court is always to determine its own jurisdictional
authority. . . . "
Ct. App. 1987).

Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah
That is true even to the point of the Court

itself raising its own lack of jurisdiction.

Coray v. Southern

Pac. Co., 184 P.2d 963, 966 (Utah 1947).
Third, the Court held that, in any event, Anna Lee had
appealed the dismissal of the original complaint, which was
itself a final order.

The "finality" of the first dismissal

order is irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue raised here,
5

however.2

The only appropriate question is, "Who can take the

appeal of an otherwise final order?"

Certainly not strangers to

the action, or those who at the time of appeal are no longer
parties.

Anna Lee, by her own admission, was no longer a party.

She could not appeal.
D.

A Non-Party Cannot Appeal
Only parties to a lawsuit may appeal. An illustrative

case is Macricsilk Corp. of New Jersey v. Vinson, 924 F.2d 123
(7th Cir. 1991).

Magicsilk was the original named plaintiff.

Vader Group, the purchaser of Magicsilk7s assets, filed a motion
to be substituted as plaintiff.

The motion was granted.

Vader subsequently refused to cooperate in discovery in
open defiance of a court order.

The trial court dismissed the

action with prejudice as a result. A notice of appeal was filed
in the name of Magicsilk.

Id. at 125.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noticed the
problem created by the substitution of Vader as plaintiff and the
notice of appeal filed by Magicsilk.

Accordingly, the court

itself raised the issue of appellate jurisdiction which had been
neglected by the parties during briefing.

Id. at 124. It

dismissed the appeal, observing:

2

The first dismissal order would have been final for appeal
had Anna Lee not elected to amend the complaint. Having done
that, the order was at best interlocutory for purposes of appeal
because the controversy between the litigants had not ended.
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton. 600 P.2d 538, 539 (Utah 1979).
6

This Court lacks jurisdiction over Magicsilk's appeal.
Only parties to a lawsuit may appeal an adverse
judgment. Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304, 108
S.Ct. 586, 587, 98 L.Ed.2d 629 (per curiam); Bense v.
Starling, 719 F.2d 241, 244 (7th Cir. 19&3). Magicsilk
Corp. of New Jersey, the only company lis;ted on the
notice of appeal, has not been a party to this suit
since the district court granted Vader's motion to
substitute.
Id. at 125.
During oral argument in this appeal on October 20,
1992, Judge Norman H. Jackson asked Reid Lewis, counsel for Dean
Witter and Ralph Pahnke, whether Anna Lee somehow retained a
right to appeal, following substitution, because her name still
appeared on some pleadings, specifically the order which had
dismissed Mr. Dudley's amended complaint.

Mr. Lewis said no.

The inadvertent use of one's name in a pleading caption is a
clerical error, one which does not restore her presence in the
action.

That issue arose in Magicsilk, too.

FollDwing the

substitution of Vader, the parties acted to some extent as though
substitution had not occurred.

For example, Vader and the

defendants still referred to the plaintiff as Magicsilk.
court documents listed Magicsilk as plaintiff, too.

Trial

Id. at 124.

And, the judgment eventually entered was directed against
Magicsilk, not Vader.

Id. at 125.

oversights as they were —

These errors —

clerical

did not breathe life into Magicsilk.

It simply ceased to be a party following substitution.
Another illustrative case is Appeal of E'istrict of
Columbia Nurses 7 Ass'n., 854 F.2d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
7

In that

case several individual nurses and their professional
association, District of Columbia Nurses' Association ("DCNA"),
brought an action challenging the failure of the District of
Columbia to pay appropriate overtime pay under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The District of Columbia contended DCNA lacked

standing under the Act and in response, plaintiffs moved to amend
their complaint to remove DCNA as a party.
granted.

Their motion was

In spite of withdrawal, DCNA's name continued to appear

in the caption.
Some time later, the Court granted summary judgment in
favor of the District of Columbia and against the individual
nurses.

A notice of appeal was filed in the name of DCNA.

That

prompted the Court of Appeals to make an inquiry:
This court entered an order to show cause why the
appeal should not be dismissed since the purported
appellant was no longer a plaintiff at the time of the
judgment and no remaining plaintiff had been identified
as an appellant. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co.,
U.S.
, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 101 L.Ed.2d 285
(1988) (court of appeals only has jurisdiction over
appeals of parties identified in notice of appeal);
United States v. LTV Corp., 746 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (only party to district court action may note an
appeal).
Id. at 1449.

The Court ultimately dismissed the appeal.

It

noted the general rule "that an appellant must be a party to the
proceedings in order to file an appeal."

Id. at 1449.

DCNA had

voluntarily removed itself from the action and no longer
considered itself a party.

Id. at 1449.

8

The Court held:

This appeal was noted by a former plaintiff that had
become a stranger to the litigation. No remaining
plaintiff noted an appeal . . . .
Id. at 1451.

Cf., Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 945 F.2d 1188 (D.C.

Cir. 1991).
II.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THE TRUSTEE IMPROPERLY NEGLECTED TO
BRING THIS ACTION
The Court held Anna Lee may bring her action since the

trustee "improperly neglected" to bring it. The Court finds
neglect solely from the absence of the trustee's name in the
caption.

The Court's definition of neglect is indefensible.

It

would completely emasculate the general rule giving trustees
exclusive right to maintain trust actions.
The Court's error is highlighted by the recent,
well-reasoned opinion of Firestone v. Galbreath, 976 F.2d 279
(6th Cir. 1992).

Beneficiaries of a trust sued a trustee and

third parties on several tort claims.

The trial court dismissed

the action, ruling the beneficiaries lacked standing to pursue
trust claims against third parties.

The beneficiaries were

unable, even though given an opportunity to amend their
complaint, to allege facts (i.e., prior demand on the trustee to
sue) necessary to overcome the general rule precluding them from
pursuing trust claims.
In affirming the district court, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals first reiterated that "generally only the
trustee may bring an action on behalf of a trust," but went on to
note that "the law makes an exception where the trustee has
9

refused or neglected to bring a demanded action."

Id. at 284.

The court rejected the beneficiaries' argument that the trustee's
"improper neglect" was evidenced by the trustee's failure to
bring suit:

"This argument is a transparent exercise in

semantics by the plaintiffs.

Both terms, ^refuse' and ^neglect,'

presuppose a demand, which the trustee either will not or forgets
to bring."

Id.

Without allegations of demand made to the

trustee to bring suit for the trust, the beneficiaries lacked
standing to pursue the action.
Firestone correctly interpreted "neglect" and this
Court departed from it.

If a trustee's improper neglect is shown

merely by his failure to sue, the general rule giving trustees
the exclusive right to bring trust claims is swallowed by the
exception.

Indeed, under that definition, whenever a beneficiary

sues a third party for a trust claim, it will always mean the
trustee "neglected" to sue.

The interpretation is wrong.

A

trustee's neglect to bring an action can only be established by
allegations of demand that suit be brought, followed by the
trustee's failure to act on that demand.
It must be emphasized that the only inference drawn by
the Court of the trustee's neglect was his failure to bring this
suit.

There are no allegations demand was made and refused or

ignored.3

Absent those allegations, the Court is unable to find

3

The record makes clear that far from ignoring or refusing
to act, Anna Lee's son, James, as trustee, brought suit on other
trust claims in 1987 against these same defendants. R. 53.
10

Anna Lee comes within the exception created by her trustee's
improper neglect or refusal to bring the action.

Anna Lee lacks

standing.
The sole authority cited by the Court for its
interpretation of "neglect" is Struble v. New Jerseiy Brewery
Employees7 Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1984).
Struble does not define "neglect."

It does address, however, a

beneficiary's right to sue upon the trustee's failure to do so.
Rather than accepting this Court's overly broad approach —
allowing a beneficiary to sue whenever the trustee does not —
Struble requires the beneficiary to affirmatively allege a breach
of trust by the trustee.
III. THERE IS NO RECORD EVIDENCE OF HOSTILITY BETWEEN ANNA LEE
ANDERSON AND THE TRUSTEE
The Court correctly notes a beneficiary has standing to
pursue a trust claim against a third party if the interests of
the trustee are hostile to the beneficiary.

The Court suggests,

however, there is an indication of hostility between Anna Lee as
beneficiary and her son, James, as original trustee.
The Court does not cite any evidence of hostility.

Nor

does it draw from the allegations in the complaint any inference
of hostility between them.

Nor could the Court.

The most that

can be said of the complaint is it alleges stock held by the
Trust was transferred to James by Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke.
There is no allegation the trustee ever knew about the transfer,
let alone that it was improper.

There is no allegation he

participated in the transfer, nor that he intended it to occur.
11

In fact, the only reasonable inference to draw from the face of
the complaint is that the trustee did not know anything was
wrong.
The complaint goes to extraordinary lengths to insulate
the trustee.

The entire blame for the transfer is laid at the

feet of Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke.4

How could the trustee's

interests be hostile to the beneficiary's when they were both
allegedly duped?
IV.

THE ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR ANNA LEE ANDERSON'S
FAILURE TO JOIN THE TRUSTEE AS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY
Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke contended Anna Lee's

complaint must be dismissed for two reasons:

First, she, as

beneficiary, cannot pursue an action to collect trust assets held
by third parties; the action belongs to the trustee.

Second, she

must join the trustee, therefore, as an indispensable party.

The

Court held Anna Lee had standing to bring an action as
beneficiary, noting that its decision made it unnecessary to
address the issue of indispensable parties.
assumption —

The Court's

that standing and indispensable parties are

mutually exclusive —

is not correct.

The Court must address the issue of indispensable
parties even though it held Anna Lee has standing.

Although it

is possible a beneficiary can bring an action against a third
party, the trustee must be joined if he can be subjected to the

Anna Lee blames Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke, stock
brokers, for allowing her son, James, to administer and act on
behalf of the Trust. She holds them to a higher standard than
she does the trustee.
12

jurisdiction of the court.

4 A. Scott and W. Fratcher, The Law

of Trusts § 282.1, at 30-31 (4th Ed. 1989); Restatement of Trusts
(Second) § 282 cmt e (1959).
Even one of the cases cited by the Court in its
opinion, Struble v. New Jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust
Fund, supra, at 336-337, recognizes the rule.
Howell, 66 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1933).

So does Cherry v.

The court held the trustee

must be joined when the beneficiary sues a third party for taking
part in a breach of trust.

Id. at 716. (citation omitted).

In

Cherry, two shareholders of a corporation brought an action
against two directors.

Id. at 714. The shareholders alleged

misappropriation of trust funds by the trustee, with the
directors7 participation.

Id. at 716.

The court :.ield that when

a beneficiary sues to have a trust fund restored, the trustee
must be joined.

Id.

Similarly, Anna Lee, as a beneficiary,

could not bring this action without joining the trustee.
CONCLUSION
The Court should dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.

It was commenced by someone, Anna Lee, who is no

longer a party to the action.
The Court should affirm the district court's dismissal
of Anna Lee's complaint.

She has failed to make allegations

sufficient to establish her standing as a proper party plaintiff.
On the face of the complaint, only the trustee could have brought
the action.

13

CERTIFICATION
I, Reid E. Lewis, counsel for Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. and Ralph Pahnke, hereby certify that the Petition for
Rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay.
DATED:

December 4, 1992.
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.

Joseph J. Palmer
Reid E. Lewis
E. Jay Sheen
Attorneys for Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. and
Ralph Pahnke
Defendants and Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 4th day of December, 1992, four
copies of the Petition for Rehearing were mailed to:
James E. Morton
Ron Wolthius
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600
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